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Abstract—The objective of the SHA-3 NIST competition is
to select, from multiple competing candidates, a standard al-
gorithm for cryptographic hashing. The selected winner must
have adequate cryptographic properties and good implemen-
tation characteristics over a wide range of target platforms,
including both software and hardware. Performance evaluation
in hardware is particularly challenging because of the large
design space, wide range of target technologies, and multitude
of optimization criteria. We describe the efforts of three re-
search groups to evaluate SHA-3 candidates using a common
prototyping platform. Using a SASEBO-GII FPGA board as a
starting point, we evaluate the performance of the 14 remaining
SHA-3 candidates with respect to area, throughput, and power
consumption. Our approach defines a standard testing harness
for SHA-3 candidates, including the interface specifications for
the SHA-3 module on the SASEBO testing board.
Keywords—hardware implementation, hardware evaluation,
hash function, SHA-3
I. INTRODUCTION
We briefly explain the origin of the SHA-3 NIST com-
petition, and the need for a standard hardware evaluation
mechanism.
A. Background
Since collisions on standard hash functions were reported
in 2004, improvements to hash attack methods and hash
algorithms have progressed at a similar, rapid pace [1]. For
this reason, NIST decided to initiate development of a new
hash standard.
The selection of winning candidates is driven by considering
security as well as implementation efficiency of the proposed
hash algorithms in hardware and software. However, system-
atic cryptanalysis of hash functions is not well established,
and it is hard to measure the cryptographic strength of a hash
function beyond obvious metrics such as digest length. For this
reason the implementation efficiency of hardware and software
plays a vital role in selecting the finalists.
Several ongoing projects are evaluating the hardware ef-
ficiency of the SHA-3 candidates [3], [4], [5], [6], but the
validity and consistency of the evaluation criteria and methods
of such research are not yet well discussed. In order to evaluate
the hardware efficiency over a set of SHA-3 candidates,
we need to fix an evaluation environment (i.e. platform),
implementation method (i.e. design strategy), and performance
comparison method (i.e. evaluation criteria). Consensus on
such points is required for a fair comparison.
Because there are many possible application scenarios for
hash functions, a universal set of hardware evaluation criteria
may be hard to define. In this paper, we therefore focus on
criteria that are consistent and fair on a given platform.
B. Related Work
Recently, several research groups have proposed compre-
hensive performance evaluation methods, which evaluate a set
of hash algorithms on a common platform. These proposals
use a synthesis target.
 Tillich et al. developed an RTL Verilog code for all SHA-
3 candidates. They present syntheses results on UMC
180nm technology [3].
 Gaj et al. developed a scripting system called ATHENA,
targeted at FPGA [7]. A fair comparison is achieved by
defining a standard interface and by automatic design
space exploration.
 Baldwin et al. [8] propose several hash candidates, as
well as a standard interface to achieve a fair comparison.
C. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a platform, design strategy, and
evaluation criteria for a fair hardware evaluation of the SHA-
3 candidates. In comparison with the above efforts, we use
a prototyping approach rather than synthesis for ASIC. We
map each of the hash candidates onto a SASEBO-GII FPGA
board [9]. The candidates are then evaluated on throughput,
latency, hardware cost, and power consumption. Our evalua-
tion methods allow determination of hardware performance
independently from the interface specifications. The source
code of the SHA-3 candidates is written in RTL Verilog, and
can be reused for future ASIC development. This ASIC will
be tested on a similar SASEBO platform.
In the next sections, we detail the hardware evaluation
platform, the design strategy used for SHA-3 candidates, and
the proposed performance evaluation metrics.
II. HARDWARE EVALUATION PLATFORM FOR SHA-3
CANDIDATES
A. Overview
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Fig. 1. Evaluation Environment Using SASEBO-GII.
Figure 1 illustrates the target platform for our evaluation,
which includes a SASEBO-GII board and a PC. The SASEBO
board contains two FPGAs: a control FPGA and cryptographic
FPGA. On the PC, a test program enables a user to enter a
sample message, which is transmitted to the control FPGA via
USB. The control FPGA controls the data flow to send this
message to the cryptographic FPGA, where hash operations
are performed. After the hash operations, the digest is returned
to the PC through the control FPGA. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
the interface between the control FPGA and cryptographic
FPGA is fixed and common among all SHA-3 candidates.
The control FPGA checks the latency of a single hash
operation for input data performed in the cryptographic FPGA
and reports the number of clock cycles to the PC. The PC then
reports two different performance metrics: the number of clock
cycles including the cycles for receiving input data and that
excluding the cycles for the data input.
During hashing of a message, we also measure the power
of the hashing operation. This trace, in combination with
performance data, enables a precise characterization of the
power dissipation and energy consumption of the SHA-3
candidate on the cryptographic FPGA.
B. Hardware Interface
A key concept in our approach is the use of a standard
interface to integrate hash algorithms inside the cryptographic
FPGA. In this section, we describe the major principles of
this interface. We also compare our ideas with those of
several other proposals. A hardware interface for a SHA-3
module emulates similar functionality as the software API
interface. The hardware interface therefore needs to address
the following issues.
Handshake protocol: The hash interface needs to syn-
chronize data transfer between the SHA-3 module and the
environment. This is done using a handshake protocol and a
master protocol can be distinguished from a slave protocol
depending on which party takes the initiative to establish
synchronization. The interface in our proposal uses a slave
protocol.
Word length: Typical block and digest lengths are wider
(e.g. 512 bits) than the word length that can be provided by
standard platforms (e.g. 32 bits), so that each hash operation
will result in several data transfers. While this overhead is
typically ignored by hardware designers, it is inherently part of
the integration effort of the SHA-3 module. All of the interface
proposals leave the standard interface word length undefined,
though they implicitly assume 32 bits. In our proposal, we use
a 16-bit interface, which is defined by the data-bus between
the control FPGA and cryptographic FPGA.
Control: The functions of the software API need to be
translated to equivalent hardware control signals. Our approach
is to define additional control signals on the interface, for
example to indicate message start and end.
Padding: Finally, padding may or may not be included in
the SHA-3 hardware module. In the latter case, the hardware
module implicitly assumes that an integral number of blocks
will be provided for each digest. Common padding schemes
are defined by in-band data formatting, and this makes it pos-
sible to implement padding outside of the hardware module.
Our interface proposals leave padding to the SHA-3 designer.
We assume hardware padding will only be implemented at the
word level.
Note that there are many possible solutions to the interface
problem, and we present one possible approach. We observe
that the key issue for a fair comparison is to use a common
interface for all candidates. In addition, we will show that our
performance evaluation mechanism allows factoring out of the
overhead of the interface communication.
III. DESIGN STRATEGY
Besides a standard platform, our approach also defines a
design strategy.
The previous work for evaluating hardware performance has
been executed without using a standardized architecture, i.e.
different architectures are used.
In this paper, we evaluate the performance of SHA-3
candidates when they are used in a real system. We also use
performance metrics that enable us to separate the interface
operation from the hash operation.
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Fig. 2. Architecture of Cryptographic FPGA.
Figure 2 shows the detailed architecture of the cryptographic
FPGA that we use for evaluating hardware performance. The
cryptographic FPGA consists of an interface block that con-
trols input and output, and a core function block that executes
a hashing process. There are several SHA-3 candidates that
need to keep an input message during the hashing process. In
our environment, a message register can be prepared in the
core function block. This architecture can reuse the message
register for the next message block. Also, we may be able to
prepare an output register in the core function block that keeps
the result (e.g. 256-bit hash value). We used output register for
all second-round candidates in this paper.
IV. EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR HARDWARE SHA-3
CANDIDATES
The third component of our evaluation strategy is the
performance evaluation criteria. These are explained in this
section.
A. Evaluation Items
We implement 14 SHA-3 hash candidates on the cryp-
tographic FPGA, Xilinx Virtex-5 (xc5vlx30-3ff324) on
SASEBO-GII. We check the hardware performance in terms of
speed and hardware cost. The speed performance is evaluated
with its latency or throughput that is calculated with the
input block size, maximum clock frequency, and total number
of clock cycles with or without communication overheads.
The cost performance is evaluated by the number of slices,
registers, and LUTs. A hash function that has high throughput
with a low hardware cost is regarded as efficient. The power
consumption of the hash design is measured during a complete
hash operation. The energy cost is the integral of the power
consumption over the period of hash operation. The energy
cost is normalized to the message block length in order to
obtain a standardized nJ=bit metric.
B. Speed Performance Metrics
We use the following notations to explain the criteria:
B : Input block size
I : Total number of clock cycles
D : Critical path delay
Th : Throughput
fmax : Maximum clock frequency
M : Size of message without padding
Mp : Size of message with padding
With an input block size, we use the result as the next input
data to proceed with the entire hashing process. The clock
cycles necessary for hashing M -bit data can be expressed as
I =
Mp
B
(Iin + Icore) + Ifinal + Iout : (1)
Here, MpB is the number of hash core operations when the
hash core can perform B-bit data in one operation. Iin, Icore,
Ifinal, and Iout denote the number of clock cycles used to
input data, execute the hashing process in the core function
block, perform the final calculation process and output the
hash results, respectively. Note that the coefficients of Ifinal
and Iout are both one because these processes are only
executed when outputting the resultant data.
As a result, the throughput and latency can be expressed as
Th = Mp  fmaxMp
B (Iin + Icore) + Ifinal + Iout
; (2)
L =
Mp
Th
: (3)
When Mp is sufficiently large, for example in the case of
hashing a long message, Ifinal and Iout can be negligible
from Eq. (2). In this case, the throughput ThLongMessage is
approximated as
ThLongMessage =
Bfmax
Iin + Icore
: (4)
On the other hand, when Mp is small, for example in the
case of hashing a short message for authentication, we cannot
ignore Ifinal and Iout. Moreover, as latency is an important
metric for a short message rather than throughput, we use
Eq. (3) to compare the speed performance of the SHA-3
candidates.
Table I shows the evaluation metrics. Here, the throughput
of the core function block Thcore is
Thcore = Mp  fmaxMp
B Icore + Ifinal
: (5)
TABLE I
EVALUATION METRICS.
Long Message Short Message
(Throughput) (Latency)
Interface + Core Bfmax
Iin+Icore
Mp
Th
Core Function Block Bfmax
Icore
Mp
Thcore
V. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS FOR ALL SECOND-ROUND
CANDIDATES
In this work, we implement SHA-256 and all second-round
SHA-3 candidates aiming at a high-speed hardware imple-
mentation. 1 Although it is not possible to completely factor
1We plan to release the Verilog/VHDL source code for these 15 algorithms
at http://www.rcis.aist.go.jp/special/SASEBO/SHA3-en.html.
TABLE II
RESULTS OF THE SHA-3 CANDIDATES ON VIRTEX-5 (XC5VLX30-3FF324).
Implementation
Input Max. Total Number of Long Short Number Number Number Energy
Block Clock Clock Cycles [cycles] Message Message of of of Power [W ] [nJ=bit]
Size Freq I/F + Core Throughput M=1,024 Occupied Slice Slice Long Short Long Short[bits] [MHz] Core [Mbps] Latency [s] Slices Registers LUTs Msg Msg Msg Msg
SHA-256 512 260 148 (196) 68 (68) 899 (1,958) 1.89 (0.785) 609 1,224 2,045 0.21 0.21 1.17 1.17
BLAKE-32 512 115 121 (169) 22 (22) 487 (2,676) 3.57 (0.574) 1,660 1,393 5,154 0.27 0.27 0.49 0.49
BMW-256 512 34 98 (148) 2 (4) 178 (8,704) 10.12 (0.235) 4,350 1,317 15,012 0.41 0.41 0.07 0.09
CubeHash16/32-256 256 185 64 (272) 16 (176) 740 (2,960) 2.85 (1.297) 590 1,316 2,182 0.23 0.23 0.61 1.82
ECHO-256 1,536 149 407 (455) 99 (99) 562 (2,312) 3.05 (0.664) 2,827 4,198 9,885 0.33 0.33 0.89 0.89
Fugue-256 32 78 8 (93) 2 (39) 312 (1,248) 4.47 (1.321) 4,013 1,043 13,255 0.36 0.37 0.95 1.47
Grøstl-256 512 154 106 (164) 10 (20) 744 (7,885) 2.44 (0.260) 2,616 1,570 10,088 0.31 0.31 0.25 0.25
Hamsi-256 32 210 10 (63) 4 (9) 672 (1,680) 1.92 (0.690) 718 841 2,499 0.23 0.23 1.19 1.27
JH-256 512 201 135 (183) 39 (39) 762 (2,639) 2.25 (0.582) 2,661 1,612 8,392 0.25 0.25 0.80 0.80
Keccak(-256) 1,024 205 217 (265) 25 (25) 967 (8,397) 2.35 (0.244) 1,433 2,666 4,806 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Luffa-256 256 261 57 (114) 9 (18) 1,172 (7,424) 1.31 (0.207) 1,048 1,446 3,754 0.24 0.24 0.36 0.43
Shabal-256 512 228 143 (341) 50 (200) 816 (2,335) 2.75 (1.316) 1,251 2,061 4,219 0.23 0.23 1.19 2.15
SHAvite-3256 512 251 134 (185) 38 (38) 959 (3,382) 1.79 (0.454) 1,063 1,363 3,564 0.24 0.24 0.73 0.73
SIMD-256 512 75 142 (190) 46 (46) 270 (835) 6.32 (1.840) 3,987 6,693 13,908 0.29 0.29 1.09 1.09
Skein-256-256 256 115 75 (143) 21 (41) 393 (1,402) 3.20 (0.904) 854 929 2,864 0.26 0.26 0.86 1.08
out the designer in our comparison, the 15 algorithms were
all prototyped and tested using the same evaluation platform.
Each was evaluated according to the metrics indicated above,
covering performance, area, power consumption, and energy
consumption.
Table II shows a comprehensive summary of the measure-
ment results. As with all measurement data, it is important
to understand the assumptions used when collecting these
numbers. The table includes the following quantities for each
candidate.
 Message block size
 Highest clock frequency achievable with the design on a
Virtex-5 FPGA
 Latency in terms of clock cycles
 Throughput of the design in clock megabits per second
and latency of the design for short messages, in microsec-
onds. These numbers assume that the FPGA is operating
at the maximum achievable clock frequency for the given
design.
 Area cost of the design, in terms of occupied Virtex-5
slices, number of flip-flops, and number of LUTs.
 Power consumption of the design for long and short
messages. The power consumption is measured directly
on the core power supply (Vvccint) of the FPGA, with
the FPGA operating at 24 MHz.
 Energy consumption of the design for long and short
messages. The energy consumption is normalized against
the block size, and expressed in nJ=bit.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose an evaluation platform and
a consistent evaluation method to implement fair hardware
evaluation of cryptographic hash functions. The platform in-
cludes a SASEBO-GII evaluation board, evaluation software,
and appropriate interface definition. Using this method, we
implement all second-round SHA-3 candidates and obtain the
resulting cost and performance factors.
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